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The Leverage Ratio as a Bank Discipline Device 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Clovis Rugemintwari
 
 
This paper investigates bank portfolio composition under Basel II where the amount of 
required capital is determined by bank’s own risk assessment. We particularly show that in 
presence of asymmetric information between the bank and the supervisor, it has incentives to 
understate its risk taking which could be curbed by the addition of the simple leverage ratio as 
suggested in Basel III.  
 
 
 
LE RATIO DE LEVIER COMME FACTEUR DISCIPLINANT DES BANQUES  
 
Cet article étudie le choix de portefeuille sous le dispositif de Bâle II dans lequel la 
banque détermine le montant du capital requis en fonction de sa propre mesure du risque. 
Nous montrons en particulier qu'en présence d'asymétrie d'information entre la banque et le 
superviseur, cette dernière a des incitations à sous-estimer sa prise de risque. Ces incitations 
sont tempérées par l'adjonction du simple levier comme envisagé dans le dispositif Bâle III. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous literature (Furfine [2001], Repullo and Suarez [2004], Rime [2005] for 
instance) that analyzed the potential impact of Basel II has mainly converged in predicting a 
potential bank specialization. Banks adopting Basel II should concentrate on low risk assets 
and offer competitive borrowing conditions to this type of borrowers whereas those that stick 
to Basel I would specialize in high risk assets. This conjecture has been derived merely 
focusing on Pillar 1. Our first contribution is to show that this result no longer holds once we 
consider the asymmetric information that could exist between the bank and the supervisor 
during the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and we also show that, in this imperfect 
supervision framework, banks have incentives to understate their risk taking. This leads us to 
our second contribution that consists in studying what could be, in this context, the benefits of 
coupling Basel II with a simple leverage ratio. This investigation is justified by the recent 
propositions known as Basel III which include the simple leverage ratio as a supplement to 
Basel II (Caruana [2010]). 
 
                                                 

 Université de Limoges, LAPE, 5 rue Félix Eboué BP 3127, 87031 Limoges, France. E-mail address: 
clovis.rugemintwari@unilim.fr 
A longer version of this paper has been presented at the 2010 AFFI Spring meeting in Saint-Malo and the 59
th
 
AFSE annual Congress in Paris. I thank all the seminar participants, particularly Franck Moraux for his 
discussion. Without implicating them, I would like to thank also my supervisor Prof. Alain Sauviat and Isabelle 
Distinguin for their helpful insights. All errors are my own. 
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MODEL SET UP  
 
The bank is assumed to have a representative balance sheet comprised of, on the asset 
side, commercial loans L with inherent and discernable differences in their credit risk, and 
idle reserves R. On the liability side it has deposits D and capital K. Thus, the balance sheet 
condition requires that R+L=D+K. As it is usually assumed, we consider that the loan market 
comprises both low and high risk borrowers. Therefore, we have two types of commercial 
loans: LL for low risk loans and LH for high risk loans (L= LL + LH).  
The main objective of Basel II is to link appropriately the capital requirement to the 
risk taken. Hence, even for the same category of corporate loans, low risk loans receive a low 
risk weight wL while high risk loans receive a high risk weight wH. Thus, the regulatory 
capital ratio is computed as 𝑘2 =
𝐾
𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝑤𝐻𝐿𝐻
≥ 𝑘 where 𝑘 and 𝑘2 are respectively the 
minimum and the actual capital ratios under Basel II such that 0 < 𝑤𝐿 < 𝑤 = 1 < 𝑤𝐻. The 
bank determines its loan allocation between the two borrower segments by choosing a 
proportion 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] of low risk loans according to its risk aversion, market interest rates 
setting, and the risk weights set by the regulator. Therefore LL=𝛾L and LH=(1 − 𝛾)L. 
Concerning market interest rates, we consider two gross rates of return on the asset side: 
?̃?𝐻 = {
?̅?𝐻          with probability           𝑞
𝑟𝐻 = 0   with probability (1 − 𝑞)
 and 𝑟𝐿 respectively for high and low risk loans
1
. We 
also consider two gross rates of return on the liability side: the cost of equity (𝑟𝐾) and the cost 
of insured deposit (𝑟𝐷) with 1 < 𝑟𝐷 < 𝑟𝐾 < 𝑟𝐿
2
. We assume a risk neutral bank with the high 
risk loan being efficient. Hence, 𝐸(?̃?𝐻) = 𝑞?̅?𝐻 > 𝑟𝐿.  
With all these assumptions, the general expected profit function is written as
3
: 
𝐸(𝜋𝐺) = 𝑟𝐿𝛾𝐿 +  𝐸(?̃?𝐻)(1 − 𝛾)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷 − 𝑟𝐾𝐾                                                                              (1)                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
BANK PORTFOLIO CHOICE UNDER BASEL II 
 
 
Perfect information between the bank and the supervisor 
 
In line with previous studies and in order to only focus on the main interest of this 
paper, which is loan portfolio allocation, we consider capital requirement as a binding 
constraint. This assumption allows us to rule out the question of determining the optimal 
capital ratio. However, as recent studies show, the regulatory capital requirement is far from 
being binding in reality. For instance, Flannery and Rangan [2008] show that market 
discipline makes banks usually hold more than the regulatory capital ratio. However, as far as 
                                                 
1
 Here the low risk rate of return is assumed certain. 
2
 For reasons why equity is more costly than debt, the literature mentions tax rules, agency costs of equity, the 
relative facility in deposit collection. 
3
 Hereafter, we drop the expectation operator (𝐸()) at the left hand side of the equation for simplicity and 
substitute 𝑞?̅?𝐻  for 𝐸(?̃?𝐻) at the right hand side of the equation. 
3 
 
the minimum regulatory capital ratio is used as a benchmark, it remains a relevant constraint
4
. 
That said, the program maximisation becomes unconstrained:  
max 𝜋2 = 𝑟𝐿𝛾𝐿 +  𝑞?̅?𝐻 (1 − 𝛾)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷 − 𝑟𝐾𝐾                                                                                (2) 
  𝛾  
 Where 𝐾 = 𝑘(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾))𝐿 
We determine the portfolio allocation of the bank: 
𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝛾
= (𝑟𝐿 −  𝑞?̅?𝐻 )𝐿 + 𝑟𝐾𝑘(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)𝐿
>
<
0                                                                                       (3)
 The bank decision depends not only on interest rates differentiation, but also on the risk 
weights differentiation assigned by the regulator. Expression (3) is higher for high risk weight 
differentiation. Thus, when (𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿) >
𝑞?̅?𝐻−𝑟𝐿
𝑟𝐾𝑘
, the optimal choice for the bank will always 
be low risk assets (𝛾 = 1), which is a corner solution, in order to benefit from low capital 
cost.  
Result 1: Under the standard framework of Basel II, bank portfolio reshuffling depends, not 
only on the interest rates charged on low risk and high risk assets
5
, but also on risk weights 
differentiation. The higher the gap between risk weights for high risk and low risk assets 
(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)is, the more probable the choice of low risk assets (𝛾 = 1) will be.
 
This result is in line with the previous literature that conjectures a potential 
specialization under Basel II. The idea goes as follows: on the one hand, because equity is 
costly and given that Basel II recognizes risk sensibility and requires low capital for low risk, 
which is a new feature compare to Basel I and, on the other hand, as Basel II fails to 
incorporate capital charges for concentration risk, the risk diversification does not appeal 
beneficial in terms of capital cost saving. All in all, these studies conjecture a kind of “cherry-
picking”, large and sophisticated banks adopting Basel II would focus on low risk borrowers 
and benefit from low capital charges and hence offer competitive borrowing conditions to this 
low risk segment (Repullo and Suarez [2004]). Small and unsophisticated banks which stick 
with Basel I, as they cannot overcome the high implementing cost of Basel II, would also 
have a competitive advantage in high risk segment. Whereas high risk borrowers require 
higher capital charges under Basel II, they still require the same amount of capital under Basel 
I. Therefore, it is argued that those banks that remain under Basel I could offer lower 
borrowing cost to this segment and therefore specialize in high risk loans. This specialization 
is worrisome in the sense that high risk borrowers end up in the portfolios of small banks with 
less risk management skills (Rime [2005]). However, as argued by Feess and Hege [2008], by 
confining high risk assets into Too Small To be Bailed Out banking institutions, Basel II has 
the merit of sheltering the banking system from systemic risk. 
 
So far, we followed the previous literature and considered the standard framework 
built on the sole minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) assuming perfect supervision. In the 
following section, we question this potential specialization by considering a more realistic 
view that relaxes the perfect supervision assumption. 
 
 
Asymmetric information between the bank and the supervisor 
                                                 
4
 Our conclusions still hold when we relax the binding assumption and consider the capital ratio as a choice 
variable to be determined. 
5
 In a longer version of the paper available at http://congres.afse.fr/docs/2010/499784rugemintwari_nov2009.pdf 
we study the bank portfolio choice under the risk insensitive capital regulation and we show that it depends 
solely on rates of returns highlighting the well know result of regulatory arbitrage (Jones [2000]). The robustness 
check regarding the binding assumption is also available in the same version (see the preceding footnote). 
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In the previous section, we ignored the possible asymmetric information that could 
exist between regulators and the bankers. Here we consider that, on the one hand, banks and 
regulator’s incentives are not perfectly aligned and on the other hand, Basel II confers to the 
banks a certain superiority in terms of information as banks control entirely the information 
they communicate to the supervisor concerning their risk taking and the corresponding 
regulatory capital. To motivate our approach, suffice to read the excerpt below from Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson ([2008], p.78-79) quoting a senior investment banker wishing to remain 
anonymous: “We started looking at the implications of Basel II from the day it was published 
back in 2004...What you have to understand about complex regulations that affect our 
business is that we work intensively to minimise the impact they have on our bottom line... 
The more complex the structure the more scope there is for finding ways around it! It amazes 
me that regulators asked us to set our capital regulation weights, given the way the incentives 
are…But good luck to any supervisors who want to find out what is going on inside 
businesses – that is difficult for insiders to know fully and impossible for outsiders... The 
supervisors can never match this with the best will in the world.”[Emphasis added] 
From this excerpt, we infer that asymmetric information could exist at two levels as 
regards to the computation of the regulatory capital. On the one hand, it is difficult for banks 
to perfectly gauge the risk they take and hence, there is limited information between the bank 
and the borrower in this case
6
. On the other hand, Basel II endows the bank with the 
possibility to fully control what it communicates to the supervisor and hence there is limited 
information between the bank and the supervisor. Thus, we reasonably consider that the bank 
knows more than the supervisor does. In this model, we therefore focus on the imperfect 
information between the bank and the supervisor by assuming that what is impossible for the 
bank to know is also impossible for the supervisor. 
We assume a proportion 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] reflecting the bank’s incentives to report high risk 
assets as low risk assets. Of course, there is a cost associated with this misreport when it is 
discovered by the supervisor. We consider that the bank succeeds to understate its risk with an 
exogenous probability 𝑝 and therefore the supervisor discovers the bank’s game with 
probability (1 − 𝑝) and imposes a certain fine 𝑓, proportional to the magnitude of the bank’s 
“cheating” 7.  
Actually two regulatory penalties exist (Freixas and Parigi [2008]): increasing required 
capital and restrictions on the portfolio of risky assets, i.e. the prohibition of investments in 
certain assets. In this paper, we only consider the former. This choice is backed by the third 
principle set in the BIS founding document of Basel II (BCBS
8
 [2006], p.211-212). It 
stipulates that, “supervisors should take appropriate action if they are not satisfied with the 
results of the bank’s own risk assessment and capital allocation. [They] should expect banks 
to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require 
banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum”. 
We consider that the actual share of low risk assets is still equal to 𝛾 and its share of high 
risk assets is (1 − 𝛾). However, in order to reduce its required capital cost, the bank could 
decide to report a higher share of low risk asset to benefit from the low risk weight 
(𝑤𝐿) associated with it. Therefore, with the probability 𝑝, the bank reports and the supervisor 
sees a higher share of low risk assets  𝛾′. Where 𝛾′ = 𝛾 + 𝑖(1 − 𝛾). As discussed above, with 
                                                 
6
 This could particularly be true during the boom period where it is well known that “market-price based, risk-
sensitive models tell banks in the up-cycle that risks have fallen and capital is sufficient for more risk-taking” 
Goodhart and Persaud [2008]. 
7
 The same reasoning applies if we consider that the bank unwillingly understates its risk taking. For 
convenience, we will only refer to "cheating". 
8
 BCBS stands for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
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probability (1 − 𝑝), the supervisor requires the dishonest bank to hold a higher regulatory 
capital ratio 𝑘 + 𝑓𝑘, where 𝑓 = 𝑠𝑖(1 − 𝛾) is the fine. We assume that only banks that satisfy 
the sanctions remain in activity. The proportionality coefficient 𝑠 ≥ 0 represents the 
supervisor’s severity. Hence, the new bank profit function under asymmetric information is 
written as: 
 𝜋2
𝐴𝐼 = 𝑟𝐿𝛾𝐿 + 𝑞?̅?𝐻 (1 − 𝛾)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷 − 
             𝑟𝐾𝑘𝐿[𝑝(𝑤𝐿 𝛾
′ + 𝑤𝐻(1 −  𝛾
′)) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑓)(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾))]                       (4)  
With this expression, we are able to assess whether the bank has incentives to understate its 
risk taking, and if so, under which conditions this bank behaviour is possible. To do so, we 
compare profit functions under Basel II with perfect supervision (equation(2)) and Basel II 
with supervision under asymmetric information (equation(4)). For this purpose, we solve the 
following inequality: 𝜋2
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2 > 0 for sanctions magnitude 𝑠. We get the following result 
that we call the risk understating condition (RUC): 
𝜋2
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2 > 0 for 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑝(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)
(1−𝑝)(𝑤𝐻−𝛾(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)
9                                                                         (5)                                                        
Expression (5) means that, for a given value of bank’s ability to understate its risk 𝑝, unless 
the supervisor’s sanction is above a certain minimum 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛, the bank will benefit from  
understating a portion 𝑖 ∈ ]0,1] of high risk loans as low risk loans. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between the bank’s ability to misreport  𝑝 and the required supervisor’s 
minimum sanction 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 needed to have 𝑖 = 0
10. 
 
According to the chart above, we can see that for a mere 20% (𝑝 = 0.8) chance of the 
supervisor to detect bank’s game, he needs to be tough enough by imposing harsh sanctions 
mounting to 𝑠 = 2.18 at least. This implies, under our assumptions, an extra capital ratio to 
the regulatory minimum requirement 𝑓𝑘 = 8.72% and therefore, the bank should hold a risk 
weighted capital ratio of 16.72 % at least. 
Now that we have determined the conditions under which the bank could misreport its 
risk taking to maximise its profit, we can determine the optimal choice of the bank as regards 
to its actual share of low risk assets and its misreporting incentives magnitude. Hence, the 
maximisation of 𝜋2
𝐴𝐼 with respect to 𝛾 and 𝑖 gives the following system of two equations:  
{
𝜕𝜋2
𝐴𝐼
𝜕𝛾
= (𝑟𝐿 −  𝑞?̅?𝐻 )𝐿 + 𝑟𝐾𝑘(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)𝐿 [𝑝(1 − 𝑖) − (1 − 𝑝) (2𝑠𝑖𝛾 − 𝑠𝑖 −
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿
𝑠𝑖 − 1)] = 0  (6)
𝜕𝜋2
𝐴𝐼
𝜕𝑖
= 𝑟𝐾𝑘(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)𝐿 [𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑠 (
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿
− 𝛾)] = 0                                                                       (7)
       
                                                 
9
 One can show that, when 𝑝 = 1, i.e., when the bank has the full ability to cheat, it could reap higher profit by 
misreporting its risk-taking for every possible sanction 𝑠. 
10
 We assume (for all figures) that 𝑤𝐿 = 0.8, 𝑤𝐻 = 1.4 and 𝛾 = 0.5. Other configurations do not modify the 
main conclusion. For instance, when the risk weight gap is less than the one assumed above, we find that for low 
probability 𝑝, the minimum sanction is rather low (the opposite is true), but for high values of 𝑝, 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛  remains 
very high. 
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The second derivative of 𝜋2
𝐴𝐼 with respect to 𝛾 shows that we have a concave function and 
therefore, the programme maximisation admits a maximum. We derive the optimal actual low 
risk asset share 𝛾∗ and bank’s optimal incentives i which are given by the expressions: 
𝛾∗ =
𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿
−
𝑝
(1−𝑝)𝑠
 and 𝑖∗ =
𝑟𝐾𝑘(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)−(𝑞?̅?𝐻−𝑟𝐿)
𝑟𝐾𝑘((1−𝑝)𝑠𝑤𝐿−𝑝(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿))
                                                                  (8)                                                                                                                                                                  
We see that the bank maximises its profit by diversifying its portfolio. Above 𝛾∗, its profit 
decreases and hence, the bank rationally chooses (1 −  𝛾∗) of high risk assets. The expression 
(8) shows that the higher the gap between low and high risk weight asset (𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿), the 
higher the supervisor’s severity 𝑠 and/or the lower the ability to “cheat” 𝑝 are, the higher the 
optimal low risk share 𝛾∗ should be. 
Result 2: In presence of asymmetric information between banks and the supervisor, the bank 
has incentives to understate its risk taking and the optimal portfolio allocation is no more a 
corner solution. There is an optimal low risk asset share 𝛾∗ above which the bank is not 
willing to go.  
 
We can infer from the expression (5) that lim𝑝→1 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 = ∞. Therefore it seems 
difficult, if not impossible, for the supervisor to devise appropriate sanctions to deter the bank 
from misreporting its risk assessment when the regulator can only detect bank’s wrongdoing 
with very limited ability (high values of 𝑝). Thus, in the following section, we study the 
suggestion of coupling Basel II with a simple leverage ratio
11
 as envisaged in the recent 
recommendations known now as Basel III (Caruana [2010]). 
 
 
 
BANK PORTFOLIO CHOICE UNDER BASEL II PLUS A LEVERAGE RATIO 
 
Here, we consider a case in which the regulator requires the bank to hold 
simultaneously a risk weighted capital ratio (Basel II) and a simple capital leverage ratio. 
Hence, the bank has to satisfy
12
: 
{
𝑘𝐿𝑅 =
𝐾
𝐿
≥ 𝑘                                
𝑘2 =
𝐾
𝑤𝐿𝛾𝐿 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾)𝐿
≥ 𝑘
                                                                                                      (9) 
The bank profit functions are written as: 
𝜋2𝐿𝑅 = 𝑟𝐿𝛾𝐿 +  𝑞?̅?𝐻 (1 − 𝛾)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷 − 𝑟𝐾𝑘𝐿 𝑚𝑎𝑥{1, (𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾))}                        (10) 
under perfect supervision or, 
 𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 = 𝑟𝐿𝛾𝐿 + 𝑞?̅?𝐻 (1 − 𝛾)𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷𝐷 −                                                                                 
            𝑟𝐾𝑘𝐿 𝑚𝑎𝑥{1, [𝑝(𝑤𝐿 𝛾
′ + 𝑤𝐻(1 −  𝛾
′)) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑓)(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾))]}   (11)                                                               
 under imperfect supervision. 
In order to investigate the bank behaviour concerning its incentives to misreport its 
own risk assessment, we proceed like previously by solving (11) − (10) > 0. This inequality 
                                                 
11
 To our knowledge, only Blum [2008] has modelled the suggestion of coupling Basel II with a simple leverage 
ratio. However our approach differs from his on several aspects. For instance, we define low and high risk banks 
subsequent to the bank portfolio choice while Blum’s interpretation of the two types is that the safe banks are 
operated by competent, efficient managers and the risky banks are operated by less competent managers who do 
not have access to the safe, profitable projects. He ignores the question of portfolio choice which is at the core of 
our paper.  
12
 We assume the same minimum regulatory capital ratio 𝑘 for simplicity. In the future research, it could be 
interesting to conduct calibrations on what should be the appropriate value of 𝑘 for the leverage ratio. 
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offers technically four potential cases where only two are consistent with our framework. In 
fact, if the risk adjusted capital is less than the leverage capital, therefore the bank has to 
satisfy the latter and there is no risk understating
13
. Thus, we only consider that the risk 
adjusted capital under Basel II with perfect information is equal or higher than the leverage 
capital. Hence, the two possible cases detailed below correspond to the situation where both 
the risk adjusted capital under perfect and imperfect information are above the simple 
leverage capital and the situation where the risk adjusted capital under imperfect information 
is less than the simple leverage capital. Note however that in the latter case, the bank will be 
obliged to hold the minimum capital required by the leverage capital constraint. 
 
 
The leverage capital ratio constraint is not binding 
 
In this case, the situation is such that the risk adjusted capital, both under perfect and 
imperfect supervision, is superior to the simple leverage ratio. To find out under which 
conditions the bank could benefit from understating its risk taking, we solve the following 
system compounded by three inequalities to be simultaneously satisfied. That is: 
{
𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2𝐿𝑅 > 0                                                                                                   
(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾)) − 1 ≥ 0                                                                               
𝑝(𝑤𝐿 𝛾
′ + 𝑤𝐻(1 −  𝛾
′)) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑓)(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾)) − 1 ≥ 0
    
The system is satisfied, i.e. the bank makes profit by understating its risk (𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2𝐿𝑅 > 0) 
given that the leverage ratio is not binding under the following conditions: 
 
Table 1: Risk understating conditions in the case of non binding leverage capital constraint  
 
Where: 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛  =
(𝑤𝐻−1)(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)
(1−𝛾)(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)
, 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑝(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿)
(1−𝑝)(𝑤𝐻−𝛾(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿))
, 
𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ =
1+(1−𝑝)(1−𝛾)𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿(𝑝+𝛾(1−𝑝))
(1−𝑝)(𝑤𝐻−𝛾(𝑤𝐻−𝑤𝐿))
 and 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1−(1−𝛾)𝑤𝐻−𝛾𝑤𝐿
(1−𝛾)((𝑤𝐻(𝑠(1−𝑝)(1−𝑠𝛾)−𝑝)−𝑤𝐿(𝑝+𝑠(1−𝑝))𝛾)
 
These results have to be compared with those obtained under sole Basel II in order to 
highlight the role, if any, of supplementing the simple leverage to Basel II. We notice that the 
results in the first column are equivalent to those under sole Basel II. Thus, we infer from this 
similarity that under low bank’s ability to understate its risk taking (low 𝑝) (or equivalently 
high supervisor’s power), the simple leverage ratio is superfluous and thus, unnecessary in 
curbing bank’s incentives to misreport its risk taking. On contrary, when 𝑝 is high (remaining 
columns), the fraction of high risk assets that the bank could potentially masquerade as low 
risk assets is bounded from above and depend on  𝑝 and 𝑠. One can easily show that the upper 
bound limit of 𝑖 decreases as 𝑝 gets higher and higher. It reaches the minimum when 𝑝 = 1 
(see figure 3 below). 
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 Formally, we have(11) ⇔ (10). 
𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2𝐿𝑅 > 0 
Low “cheating” ability High “cheating” ability 
0 < 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑝 < 1 𝑝 = 1 
0 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′  𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∀𝑠 ≥ 0 
∀0 < 𝑖 ≤ 1 
 
0 < 𝑖 ≤ 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 
 
∀0 < 𝑖 ≤ 1 
 
0 < 𝑖 ≤ 1 −
1 − 𝑤𝐿
(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)(1 − 𝛾)
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 : Sole Basel II 
 : Basel II coupled with a simple leverage ratio 
Figure 2: Relationship between the bank’s 
ability to misreport 𝒑 and the supervisor’s 
minimum sanctions 𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒏 and 𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒏
′ . 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between the actual 
supervisor’s sanction 𝒔, the bank’s 
ability 𝒑 and incentives 𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒙 to misreport 
its risk.
From figure 2 we can see that, even though the minimum supervisor’s sanction needed to 
deter completely the bank from misreporting its risk remains the same, that is 𝑖 = 0 for every 
𝑠 > 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛, we notice that the simple leverage ratio introduces an upper bound limit 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 for 
lower supervisor’s minimum sanction than 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′  as detailed on figure 3. 
Figure 3 shows how supplementing Basel II with the simple risk insensitive leverage ratio 
affects the bank’s incentives to understate their risk reporting. It depicts for a given value of 
bank’s ability to misreport its risk 𝑝 > 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, the range of supervisor’s minimum sanction 𝑠 
and the corresponding upper bound limit of bank’s incentives to misreport its risk 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥. The 
figure highlights the role of the simple leverage ratio in curbing bank’s incentives to “cheat”. 
This means that, for a given supervisor’s sanction 𝑠 lower than 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ , the bank would not 
misreport a fraction of high risk asset as low risk asset higher than 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 without breaching the 
simple leverage ratio requirement. For instance, for bank’s ability to cheat 𝑝 = 0.8, the 
supervisor can completely deter the bank from cheating by setting a sanction 𝑠 ≥ 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
2.18. If not, the chart shows that for lower sanction than 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ =1.27, the maximum fraction of 
high risk asset the bank could misreport is lower than the unity (𝑖 = 1) found under sole 
Basel II. For example, for the same 0.8p  , if 𝑠 = 1, the maximum fraction the bank could 
misreport is  𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥= 0.77 and the upper bound limit decreases for lower sanction 𝑠 or higher 
bank’s ability 𝑝. We have  𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥=0.42 for 𝑠 = 0 for instance. This limiting role of the leverage 
ratio is of great importance notably if we consider the issue of supervisor’s forbearance. 
 
 
The leverage capital ratio constraint is binding 
 
In this case, we consider the situation where the bank understates significantly its risk 
reporting and therefore the risk adjusted capital under Basel II with imperfect information is 
lower than the leverage capital. Hence, the former system of three inequalities is slightly 
modified and becomes: 
{
𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2𝐿𝑅 > 0                                                                                                     
(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾)) − 1 ≥ 0                                                                              
𝑝(𝑤𝐿 𝛾
′ + 𝑤𝐻(1 −  𝛾
′)) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑓)(𝑤𝐿𝛾 + 𝑤𝐻(1 − 𝛾)) − 1 < 0
    
Thus, when the leverage ratio binds, the bank makes profit by understating its risk only under 
these conditions: 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p
1
2
3
4
5
6
smin,s
,
min
0i
 
 
0i 
 
 
0, maxi i   
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Table 2: Risk understating conditions in the case of binding leverage capital constraint
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Notice that, contrary to the previous non binding case, the situations where the bank can make 
profit by understating its risk are rather rare. For instance, the case where the bank has less 
capability (𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛) no longer exists. The table above indicates that the bank only benefits 
from understating its risk if, at the same time, it is capable enough, the supervisor is less 
severe and it masquerades a considerable fraction of high risk as low risk assets. In this case 
too, we can see how the coexistence of the simple leverage ratio and Basel II is superior to the 
sole Basel II. Whereas the bank could gain by “cheating” for every value of 𝑝 and 𝑖 when 
𝑠 < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛 under sole Basel II, now, not only 𝑝 has to be superior to 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑖 > 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ , but also 
the supervisor’s minimum sanction necessary to deter the bank from “cheating” 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′
 
is lower 
( 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛). 
 
All in all, coupling Basel II with a simple leverage ratio has several merits when the 
supervisor ability to detect and sanction banks’ wrongdoing is weak. We can see how the 
simple leverage ratio, on the one hand, substantially lowers the maximum the bank can 
misreport when the supervisor is completely unable to detect and/or sanction the bank (non 
binding case). In the other hand, it tightens the conditions under which the bank could “cheat” 
(binding case). The supplement of the simple leverage requirement prevents banks from 
holding a capital ratio lower than 𝑘 = 𝐾 𝐿⁄  which could otherwise be possible under some 
circumstances of the sole Basel II. Indeed, even in a situation where the bank has full ability 
to "cheat" (𝑝 = 1) and the sanction is absent (𝑠 = 0), the leverage ratio guarantees that the 
bank holds at least a capital level 𝑘𝐿 > 𝑘𝑤𝐿𝐿. 
Result 3: When supervisor’s ability to detect bank’s risk misreporting and its sanction 
enforcement are relatively weak, the supplement of a simple leverage ratio to self risk 
reporting Basel II helps to curb bank’s incentives to understate its risk. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 We present a simple model that shows the promises and the limits of Basel II and we 
argue that the supplement of a simple leverage to Basel II offers a higher outcome.  
 Basel II was built on the idea nicely put by Prescott [2004]: “After all, who knows the 
risks of bank’s assets better than the bank itself”. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider 
that the bank’s supervisor has only limited ability to know the true risk faced by the bank. 
Moreover, given the high cost of capital and the bank tendency to save on regulatory capital, 
high risk banks have less, if at all, incentives to reveal their true type. That is the reason why 
it is important to go beyond the first Pillar and assess how supervisors can induce truthful 
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 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′  are the same as in Table 1 and 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛
′  has the same expression as 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥 in Table 1. 
𝜋2𝐿𝑅
𝐴𝐼 − 𝜋2𝐿𝑅 > 0 
High “cheating” ability 
𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑝 < 1 
 
𝑝 = 1 
0 ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑛
′  
 
∀𝑠 ≥ 0 
𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛
′ < 𝑖 ≤ 1 
 
1 −
1 − 𝑤𝐿
(𝑤𝐻 − 𝑤𝐿)(1 − 𝛾)
< 𝑖 ≤ 1 
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bank reports on their risk taking. It is what this paper has tried to do. We show that sanctions 
or penalties imposed for non-compliance are critical for determining bank incentives. 
However, in some circumstances, that is when supervisors’ ability to detect bank’s misdeed is 
very low, sanctions needed under sole Basel II to affect the incentives of banks to send 
accurate reports are so huge that it seems impossible to implement. In this case, we show that 
coupling Basel II with a simple leverage ratio is necessary as it lowers the minimum sanction 
needed to induce truthful risk report and curbs bank’s incentives to “cheat”. This conclusion is 
consistent with the very few formal studies that analyse this issue (Blum [2008]) and the 
various propositions subsequent to the recent subprime mortgage crisis (Hildebrand [2008], 
BCBS [2009] for instance) that advocate a leverage ratio as a backstop to Basel II. The simple 
leverage ratio which is easily computable and verifiable reveals itself as a necessary tool to 
curb banks’ incentives to understate the risks they take. It also appears as a necessary 
palliative remedy to supervisor’s imperfection and forbearance. 
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